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Land Use Zoning In America: 
The Case for Inclusionary Policy 
Thomas Geffner 
 
 Residential zoning code has been one of the most powerful 
forces in shaping the growth of modern American cities. By 
regulating which types of buildings can go where, zoning code has led 
to the creation of suburbs as we know them, with row after row of 
detached single-family homes. Indeed, the American city would look 
drastically different if it were not for the creation of zoning codes. But 
how did the institution that is American zoning come to exist? This 
essay will attempt to answer that question by exploring the early 
history of zoning, starting in the 1910s. It will also look at the impact 
of zoning on America’s poorest residents. Has the division of 
residential zones into mostly large lots with minimum home sizes 
excluded the poor from the suburbs? The correlation between zoning 
and economic exclusion has been studied, and a strong connection 
discovered. Given this, what can be done to remedy the problem? An 
alternative to current law, inclusionary zoning, has been explored and 
shows promise for fixing some of the problems that current zoning 
creates. 
 According to the Encyclopedia of Housing, zoning refers to 
the “enactment and enforcement of legislation by local governments 
to control the development of land by regulating its use” (Weinstien 
2012, 791). This regulation, which controls features such as lot size 
and building height, allows municipalities to determine, with great 
precision, what type of buildings will get built in their towns. At a 
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broader level, zoning allows for the forced separation of land uses. It 
is this part of zoning that is most easily noticeable: the majority of 
suburban communities in America exist as they do because of land-
use separations. 
 Zoning has existed for hundreds of years. In ancient China, 
writer Kuan-Tzu spoke of the benefits of land-use separation (Salsich 
2003). The actual practice of zoning as a means of control started in 
Germany in the 1880s in the suburb of Altona (Weinstein 2012). The 
export of zoning to America began in the early 1900s. For city 
planners, zoning was seen as a way to steer urban development in a 
direction that would benefit the community as a whole. For real estate 
developers and business owners, zoning was a useful tool to maintain 
property values (Weinstein 2012). In addition to support from 
intellectuals and special interests, zoning was extremely popular 
among the public (Fischel 2001).  It is this broad appeal that allowed 
zoning to rapidly take off in America.  By 1916, eight cities had some 
form of zoning ordinance in place, and over the next 20 years, an 
additional 1300 municipalities adopted land control techniques 
(Fischel 2001). 
 Zoning was first implemented in America in New York City 
during 1916 (Weinstein 2012) to control rampant overcrowding 
(Salsich 2003). In 1924, the US Chamber of Commerce created the 
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA). The SZEA created a 
standard framework that states could follow in order to implement 
zoning (University of Pennsylvania Law Review 312). It established 
zoning as a “police power” that did not require amendments to a 
state’s constitution in order to be legal (Standard State 1924). Two 
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years later, the Supreme Court weighed in on the legality of zoning in 
the landmark case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company. 
The court sided with the Chamber of Commerce, again emphasizing 
that zoning was a legitimate use of police power (Weinstein 2012). 
After this decision, the legality of zoning was unarguable. As zoning 
had passed through both legislative and judicial branches at the 
federal level, states were encouraged to create comprehensive zoning 
plans. By 1930, 80% of America’s urban population lived in 
municipalities with zoning controls, many of which were patterned 
off of the 1916 New York ordinance (Weinstein 2012).    
 For the municipal government, zoning was a welcome 
addition to city code. As developments in public transit allowed a 
steady stream of workers to flock to suburban housing, newly 
incorporated fringe cities faced massive increases in population. 
These once quiet municipalities were unprepared for the growth. As 
subdivisions were built at a rapid pace, cities faced the prospect of 
expensive infrastructure construction. By zoning large minimum lot 
sizes, the towns were able to limit the money that they would need to 
spend on services (Fischel 2001). Additionally, as noted by Fischel, 
zoning helped enable towns to levy efficient property taxes, and 
guarantee high tax returns by limiting the economic makeup of 
communities.  
 Among homeowners, zoning was equally embraced. As 
workers moved out of the cities and bought suburban houses, they 
sought ways to protect their investments. A home was, in most cases, 
the biggest capital asset that an individual would ever own, so 
homebuyers logically feared anything that might cause their property 
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values to lower. These fears led homeowners to support residential 
zones that were free of commercial and industrial institutions and 
were made up of people of the same socioeconomic class. 
Development patterns prior to zoning laws reflected these desires. In 
an attempt to appeal to the masses, developers created neighborhoods 
of homogenous income and attempted to control land-use in their 
subdivisions (Fishcel 2001). In order to shield communities from 
encroaching commercial and industrial uses, subdividers utilized 
protective covenants. However, these protective covenants were only 
able to control lands within the subdivision; outside these areas was a 
free-for-all where “incompatible uses” existed (Fischel 2001). 
Homeowners were fearful of these “incompatible uses,” especially 
multifamily dwellings (Salsich 2003). In order to receive the 
protection that failed covenants could not provide, residents turned to 
their municipal governments, pressuring local administration to adopt 
zoning codes.  
 Although zoning has been seen as a great gift for the middle-
class homeowner, not all members of society have benefited from 
these exclusive ordinances. By limiting the development of 
multifamily (apartment) housing, zoning has reduced the supply of 
dwellings that are within reach for the poorest Americans. Opposition 
to adjacent apartment communities has long been an issue for single-
family homeowners. The general societal distaste of multifamily 
housing was well reflected in cases heard in the courts, and when 
presiding over Euclid v. Ambler, Justice Sutherland delivered an 
opinion referring to apartment houses as “a mere parasite, constructed 
in order to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive 
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surroundings created by the residential character of the [single-family 
home] district” (Euclid v Ambler 1926). Large-scale single-family 
zoning offered homeowners safety from these ‘parasitic’ dwellings. 
When multifamily development is excluded from a residential zone, 
families who cannot afford a single-family home are locked out of the 
region. A report published by the American Planning Association 
(APA) which looked at multifamily housing, zoning policy and 
affordability across several different cities in the United States found 
that zoning regulations can indeed serve as a barrier in the creation of 
multifamily housing. Although apartment housing is not always 
affordable (and single-family homes are not always expensive), the 
APA found that communities with the most barriers to multi-family 
housing development were often the most expensive (Knapp 2007).  
Zoning has been found to increase the price of single-family homes, 
which provides a further barrier for low income families. Although 
the extent of this effect has been argued, a review of the literature 
conducted by Quigley and Rosenthal concludes that “a number of 
credible papers seem to bear out theoretical expectations [that zoning 
limits the supply of buildable land and thus leads to larger and more 
expensive homes]” (Quigley 2005). Salsich and Glaeser, two 
prominent researchers studying the impact of zoning, investigate cost 
increases due to zoning. Salsich looks at growth management efforts 
in Florida, finding that they have led to “reduced housing affordability 
in a statistically significant character” (Salsich 2003, pg. 8). He draws 
upon previous scholarship to show six zoning techniques that 
effectively exclude poor residents. These techniques include control 
over lots (size and frontage requirements), control over housing size 
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(minimum square footage and maximum bedroom numbers) and 
control over accessory structures (restrictions on mobile homes and 
multiple dwellings per lot) (Salsich 2003). By mandating lot sizes, 
zoning restricts buildable land, which in turn lowers the housing 
supply. The supply of land is an important part of Glaeser’s work on 
housing affordability. He identifies that housing costs across the 
country are for the most part close to construction costs (Glaeser 
2002). The implication of this is that in expensive areas of the 
country, such as New York, Portland or San Francisco, high housing 
prices are tied to land value. By limiting the buildable supply of land, 
zoning artificially inflates land costs, leading to an affordability crisis 
(Glaeser 2002).  
 Due to the inequalities caused by zoning law, courts have 
begun to discuss the legality of these laws. As noted in the University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review, zoning can deny equal protection under 
the law for poor citizens (1972). In 1975 and 1983, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court passed a series of decisions known as the Mount 
Laurel Doctrine which required municipalities to actively address the 
issue of affordable housing. Although the doctrine has provided a 
concrete framework, it has simply not been upheld in practice (Talbert 
2005). While zoning can be amended at a local scale, court hearings 
of this type are problematic because participation is limited to 
developers and neighboring residents (University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 1972). This has the unfortunate effect of excluding 
members of the community who would advocate to change the zoning 
code. Zoning is implemented at a municipal level, meaning that court 
decisions at a statewide or higher level are unlikely to remedy the 
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situation. Also, due to the ruling that zoning is a police power, it can 
be challenging for community members to have their voices heard 
regarding zoning issues. Finally, owing to the precedent of Euclid v 
Ambler, the courts as a whole favor the idea of zoning, having 
reinforced it as a reasonable use of the police power. The University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review has concluded that the many barriers to 
effective litigation render it extremely unlikely that a solution to 
America’s zoning problem can and will be found in the courts (1972).  
 It would seem as though zoning in America is here to stay. 
Powerful factors have helped to entrench the practice of zoning in 
American society. These factors include homeowners, who seek to 
protect their assets, as well as judicial decisions continually affirming 
the legitimacy of zoning. However, there is increasing pressure to 
reform zoning law from social justice advocates and community 
organizers. It is clear that a change to this institution is necessary. The 
technique of inclusionary zoning has been explored by communities 
as a way to right the inequities that zoning has caused.  
 Where traditional, also known as exclusionary zoning, tends to 
limit the economic makeup of neighborhoods, inclusionary zoning 
does just the opposite, helping to foster diversity (Talbert 2005). This 
goal is accomplished by mandating that a certain percentage of units 
in new developments be “affordable.” The definition of “affordable” 
is set by the municipality or state undertaking the inclusionary zoning, 
and usually is designed to be accessible for families making less than 
80% of the median income. In addition, inclusionary zoning typically 
includes concessions or buyouts to developers in exchange for 
providing the affordable units (Talbert 2005). Several scholars have 
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advocated this technique as a potential solution to the affordable 
housing crisis in America (Salsich 2003, Blaesser et. Al. 2002, The 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1972). 
 There are a number of successful examples of inclusionary 
zoning in America. According to Talbert, this technique has produced 
over 100,000 units as of 2005 (Talbert 2005). Specific communities 
that have been successful in implementing inclusionary zoning 
include Cambridge, Massachusetts (Blaesser et. Al. 2002) and the 
Miami Valley region in Ohio (The University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 1972). Overall, the inclusionary zoning movement is gaining 
momentum, and 24 states now have some level of comprehensive 
zoning law to address affordable housing concerns (Salsich 2003). 
However, municipalities interested in creating inclusionary zoning 
laws must be mindful, as there have been several notable failures of 
this technique, including Barnstable, Massachusetts (Blaesser et. al. 
2002). Communities interested in inclusionary zoning should look to 
municipalities such as Cambridge and Miami Valley as guides.  
 The effective implementation of inclusionary zoning relies on 
several basic tenants. First, it is important to note that inclusionary 
zoning has faced controversy and litigation, and will continue to do so 
(Talbert 2005). Mandating that a certain percentage of units in a 
developments be affordable will likely reduce developers’ returns. 
Many of the developers may be unwilling to trade potential profits for 
general societal benefit. However, as growth relies on developers, it 
will be incumbent for municipalities to cooperate with developers in 
order to create change. Indeed, the National Housing Conference 
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suggests that municipalities work with developers when creating new 
inclusionary zoning laws (Blaesser et. al. 2002).  
 If inclusionary zoning laws are rigid to the point that they 
prevent developers from meaningful profits, these laws will likely be 
challenged in court, as happened in Barnstable. Traditionally, the 
courts have sided with developers in these cases, declaring it 
unconstitutional for the government to prevent an individual from 
receiving a reasonable return on their land. Preventing this profit is 
referred to as a “taking” (Blaesser et. al. 2002). In the case of 
Barnstable, the inclusionary zoning laws were found to constitute a 
“taking” and were thus labeled an “illegal tax” (Ibid, pg. 14).  
 It is possible for municipalities to offset the loss of profit by 
providing incentives to developers. Bobrowski suggests a system of 
“carrots and sticks” in order to win over developer support (Ibid, pg 
7). The carrots in question can be provided in the form of density 
bonuses. Where mandatory set asides alone make profit difficult 
(Salsich 2003), this difficulty can be mitigated when developers are 
allowed to build an increased number of units on a given site. Density 
bonuses have been found to be an enticing solution by the University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review and Salsich (Salsich 2003, The 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1972).  For cities, allowing 
higher density is a no-cost incentive, a trait that makes it especially 
appealing to municipalities that do not have large budgets for 
affordable housing. 
 Finally, for inclusionary zoning to be successful, it needs to be 
broad and flexible. A collection of overly specific rules and 
complicated regulations will slow the development process and bog 
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down the creation of affordable housing. Inclusionary zoning is most 
successful if municipalities are open to change and are willing to 
consider situations on a case by case basis (Blaesser et. al. 2002). 
Again, cooperation with developers is necessary. If rules are too 
specific, developers will likely exploit this with the use of creative 
work-arounds, a phenomenon observed by the National Housing 
Council (Blaesser et. al. 2002).  
 Zoning represents a major paradigm in American housing. It 
has shaped, and continues to shape, residential development across 
the country. Although zoning has historically had a negative impact 
on the availability of affordable housing, it remains largely unchanged 
to this day. As housing prices continue to rise across the country, it 
has become necessary to rethink zoning codes in order to equally 
serve all Americans. The technique of inclusionary zoning is a way to 
meet the needs of poor citizens, while guarding home property values 
from unwelcome intrusion. Inclusionary zoning has faced some 
controversy. Regardless, early adoption in some communities has 
been encouraging, and its ability to create more affordable housing 
should outweigh any controversies. Municipalities looking to increase 
their supply of affordable housing would be wise to consider the 
possibility of inclusionary zoning.  
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